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Article 9

et al.: The Antitrust Treble Damages Remedy

THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGES REMEDY
A party injured as a consequence of an antitrust violation may recover three times
his actual damages. The treble damage remedy has been attacked because it does
not return value to consumers who pay higherprices for the lower quahty goods
which results from monopolistic practices. Rather the remedy could result in a
windfallfor an injuredplaintff. This Note examines the criticismsandbenefits of
the treble damage remedy andconcludes that the remedy provides a valuable incentivefor the most effective antitrust violation deterrent--theprivate attorney general.
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INTRODUCTION

The private plaintiff may soon lose incentive to sue for redress under
the antitrust laws. Under the Sherman Act of 1890,1 Congress granted
an injured private plaintiff the right to institute an antitrust lawsuit. 2 To
compensate and encourage the injured plaintiff to enforce antitrust laws,
1. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
2. Clayton Act of 1914, § 4, Pub. L. No. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982));see infra note 4. Section 4 superseded § 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
210 (1890), and § 77 of the Wilson Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 77, 28 Stat. 570 (1894). "Antitrust laws" refers only to those Acts defined in § 1 of the Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C.
§ 12 (1982), which includes the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), the Wilson Tariff
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1982), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1982). The
phrase includes § 2 of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21a
(1982), but not §§ 3 & 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13b-c (1982). See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance, 355
U.S. 389, 389-90 (1958) (private action may be maintained for unlawful price discriminations violative of § 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, but
not for sales at unreasonably low prices which violate § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act);
Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376-82 (1958). Private plaintiffs have
been denied an antitrust cause of action under §§ 5, 12, and 14 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 54 (1982). See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485
F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (class action not allowed against manufacturer of non-prescription drugs for alleged false advertising).
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Congress provided in the Sherman Act and in the Clayton Act of 19143
that the successful private plaintiff automatically receive threefold the
amount of damages for the injury he sustained, plus attorneys' fees and
costs. 4 Armed with treble damages, the private plaintiff has become the

primary enforcer of antitrust laws. 5 Recent trends indicate, however,
that Congress and the Justice Department favor the removal of restrictions on business enterprises, including reducing the use of antitrust laws
to regulate business practices.6 To discourage proliferating antitrust litigation, Congress may diminish the plaintiff's generous incentive, the
treble damage remedy.
Treble antitrust damages have been criticized in the past and are vul3. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1982)).

4.

15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).

[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney 'sfee.
Id (emphasis added).
5. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillarof Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167
(1958). The Justice Department, Federal Trade Commission, and state attorneys general
are the other major enforcers of antitrust law. The Justice Department has exclusive jurisdiction within the government to enforce the Sherman Act. P. MARCUS, ANTITRUST LAW
AND PRACTICE § 21 (1980). The Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department
may enforce sections of the Clayton Act. The FTC's jurisdiction, however, is superseded
in some areas by other federal agencies. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 158 n.62 (3d
ed. 1981). The Justice Department sometimes intervenes in hearings before federal agencies. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 240 (1977). It also assists
state attorneys general and their staffs. See P. MARCUS, supra § 23.
6. Sims & Lawlor, Treble Damage Remedy Deserves Re-examination, Legal Times of
Wash., Oct. 26, 1981, at 40, col. 1. Antitrust law has been undergoing substantial review
and refinement. See Garvey, Report of Consultant to HouseJudiciay Committee on His Study of
the Treble Damage Remedy, [Mar.] ANTITRUST OF TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1154, at
356 (Mar. 1, 1984). For example, various bills that were before the 97th Congress would
have altered the present application of antitrust laws substantially. See, e.g., H.R. 5789,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (to extend antitrust immunity for U.S. oil companies); H.R.
2812, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (to limit the circumstances where foreign governments
could sue under the antitrust laws); H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (to establish a
right of contribution to damages); H.R. 5246, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to remove
statutory limitations upon the application of the Sherman Act to labor organizations);
H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to amend the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and
the Federal Trade Commission Act to exclude from prosecution certain conduct involving
exports). President Reagan's former head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division,
William Baxter, saw the Department's role as public enforcer differently from previous
administrations. Baxter did not favor, for example, challenging vertical and conglomerate
mergers. See Vilkin, DOJAntitrust Nominee Shows Conservative Colors, Legal Times of Wash.,
Mar. 23, 1981, at 8, col. 1. Baxter favors changing the treble damage remedy. Antitrust
ChiefSeeks Review of Trust Law that Tnples Awards, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 46, col. 4. See
generally Taylor & Crock, Reagan Team Believes Antitrust Legislation Hurts Big Business, Wall
St. J., July 8, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
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nerable to attack. After reviewing the legislative background, 7 recent
criticism, 8 and proposed alternatives, 9 this Note concludes that the treble
damage remedy withstands condemnation and serves as a worthwhile
inducement for private plaintiffs to enforce the antitrust laws. 10
This Note responds to criticism of the treble damage award by demonstrating that the treble damage award is insubstantial, or that the treble
damage award has benefits outweighing proven deficiencies. First, this
Note responds to allegations that the treble damage remedy is inefficient,
complex, ineffective, and limits substantive legal development. Second,
the treble damage remedy, as an integral component of private antitrust
lawsuits, is discussed within a broad framework encompassing other elements contributing to or working against the success of private antitrust
actions. Finally, this Note reviews some alternatives to the treble damage remedy. Although these alternatives address some deficiencies of the
treble damage remedy, they create other difficulties, including an increase in the complexity of antitrust litigation.
II.

BACKGROUND TO PRIVATE TREBLE DAMAGE LITIGATION

In the debates prior to the enactment of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, congressmen did not vociferate major policy concerns regarding the
treble damage remedy. A congressional purpose underlying private
treble damage action nevertheless is evident. The debates suggest that
Congress intended to aid and compensate individuals who were injured
by anticompetitive behavior as well as to induce private action to enforce
antitrust laws.11 Congress sought primarily to promote competition in
the United States under the Sherman Act. 12 The Act was passed at a
7. See infra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
8. See infta notes 31-58 and accompanying text.
9. See infta notes 95-116 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
12. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), Justice Black stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic and social institutions . . . the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
356 U.S. at 4; see California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 110-11 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117,133 (1978); Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
493 (1940); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921);
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1364 (5th Cir. 1980); Greyhound
Computer Corp. v. International Business Mach., 559 F.2d 488, 504 n.37 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denid, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466,
468 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.), cerl. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Al-
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time when combinations of corporate organizations, known as trusts,
were growing geometrically, accumulating wealth, and exerting power to
oppress individual competitors.13 In the view of congressmen who provided a cause of action for private plaintiffs in section 7 of the Act, strong
competition depended on vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws.14 Enbrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 1966), rev'don othergrounds, 390 U.S. 145
(1968); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 658 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 923 (1957); Balough's of Coral Gables, Inc. v. Getz, 510 F. Supp. 741, 745 (S.D. Fla.
1981); National Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 498 F. Supp. 991, 1005
(E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1321 n.20
(D.D.C. 1978); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847, 852-53 (N.D. Cal.
1978); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 1920 (1979) ("inquiry must focus on whether the effect and,. . . purpose of the [challenged]
practice are to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy
• . .[by always restricting] competition and decreasing output,. . . or instead designed to
'increase economic efficiency' "); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 647 n.5
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972);
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388-89 (1923) (Sherman Antitrust Act intended to secure equality of opportunity and protect public against evils commonly incident to monopolies); Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) (true test of legality is whether restraint promotes or suppresses competition); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 610 (1914) (examines purposes of acts to discern injurious restraint of trade); Feddersen Motors, Inc. v.
Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 521 (10th Cir. 1950) (primary purpose is to prevent undue restraints
of interstate commerce); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 511
F. Supp. 509, 520 (E.D. La. 1981) (aimed at business combinations not unions); Allied
Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 451 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (test is whether
effect fosters competition). The phrase "full and free competition" appeared in an early
draft of the Sherman Act. 19 CONG. REC. 7513 (1888); see 21 CONG. REC. 2461 (1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman). See generally 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
103-13 (1978); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-71 (1978); 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.18 (1980); Dewey, The Economic Theory Of Antitrust. Science Or
Relgton, 50 VA. L. REV. 413, 434 (1964); Elzinga, The Goals Of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Eftciency, What Else Counts, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1194-1203 (1977);
Schwartz, "Justice"andOther Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076, 1080
(1979). For a review of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, see 1 E. KINTNER, supra
§§ 4.1-. 18; 1 J. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 1.1-.19 (1949). For a chronology of events and transcripts of legislative debates, see 1
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES

37-363 (E. Kintner ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY].

13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); 20 CONG. REC. 1457
(1889) (statement of Sen. Jones).
The growth of these commercial monsters called trusts in the last few years has
become appalling. . . .having been allowed to grow and fatten upon the public, their success is an example of evil that has excited the greed and conscienceless rapacity of commercial sharks until in schools they are to be found now in
every branch of trade, preying upon every industry, and by their unholy combinations robbing their victims, the general public, in defiance of every principle of
law or morals.
Id, see also 20 CONG. REc. 1458 (1889) (statement of Sen. George).
14. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
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forcement depended, in part, upon provisions in the legislation that induced private plaintiffs to bring lawsuits.
Congressmen were also concerned with compensation of plaintiffs.
One senator, for example, described multiple damages as "a civil remedy
for damage done," rather than a provision for penalizing wrongdoers.15
Sympathy was expressed in senatorial speeches about individual victims
of monopolistic behavior who faced great difficulty in suing the big trusts
for redress.16 Senator Sherman concluded that "[I]t is important to citizens
that they should have some remedy in a court of general jurisdiction in the
7
United States to sue for and recover the damages they have suffered."1
Consequently, Congress provided for tripling the amount of damages,
instead of doubling or merely recovering full consideration, as earlier
drafts had provided.'8 Representative Webb's famous summation of section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides for treble damages, is further
evidence of intent to compensate injured individuals. "This section
opens the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by
those who violate the antitrust laws, and gives the injured party ample
damages for the wrong suffered."19
In addition, Congress sought to induce private lawsuits by minimizing
the difficulty of obtaining the private treble damage remedy by allowing
plaintiffs to sue in federal courts. For example, the amount in controversy requirement was removed. 20 Senator Sherman thought that the
federal court's broad jurisdiction and authority to subpoena witnesses
throughout the nation would greatly assist private plaintiffs. 2 '

Under

the Clayton Act of 1914, Congress added provisions that allowed judgments in successful governmental suits to provide prima facie evidence of
violations in private suits, and permitted injunctions to issue in private
suits. 22

The broad class of permissible plaintiffs, including any person injured
in his business or property, coupled with the inducements to sue in federal courts, reflect a policy of deterring antitrust violators by providing
incentives to private parties to enforce the laws.
15. See 21 CONG. REC. 3147 (1890).

16. Id at 1768 (statement of Sen. George); id at 2468 (statement of Sen. Hiscock); id
at 2612 (statement of Sen. Reagan); id at 2615 (statement of Sen. Coke); see also 51 CONG.
REC. 9073 (1914) (statement of Rep. Webb); id at 9079 (statement of Rep. Volstead).
17. 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890).
18.

SENATE COMMITTEE OF FINANCE REPORT ON S.I, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890)

reprinted in, 1 ANTITRUST LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 12, at 93. Treble damages
appeared much earlier in the English Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, ch. 3 (1624):
"Every such pson and psons which shalbe soe hindred greeved disturbed or disquieted
. . .shall recover three tymes so much as the damages which he or they systeyned." Id.
19. 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914).
20. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) (quoted supra note 4).
21. 21 CONG. REC. 2569 (1890).
22. See Clayton Act of 1914, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
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The United States Supreme Court has supported the congressional
purpose in decisions involving private antitrust litigants.23

Federal

courts, however, have restricted the class of private plaintiffs by requiring
potential plaintiffs to establish standing to sue before granting entry to
the judicial system.

24

The courts have based this restriction on section 4

of the Clayton Act, which requires a plaintiff to suffer an injury to "business or property, by reason of" acts forbidden in the antitrust laws.25
Court decisions have construed section 4 to require a showing by plaintiff
that he has suffered pecuniary damage to a commercial interest 26 that is
27
causally related to a violation of antitrust laws.

The lower courts developed over the years two primary tests for antitrust plaintiffs: the "direct injury" test and the "target area" test. The
direct injury test is the most restrictive; it limits standing to the "first
party to purchase a product that has been affected by a violation . . .
[barring] all others." 28 The target area test is less restrictive; it permits
anyone within a sector of the economy where illegal activity has been
directed to bring a suit. 29 Circuit courts use either the direct injury test

or the target area test, but not both. The differing applications of standing tests among the circuit courts has led one writer to recommend that a
23. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
[T]reble damages also play an important role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have frequently observed. It nevertheless is true
that the treble damages provision, which makes awards available only to injured
parties, and measures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is
designed primarily as a remedy.
Id at 485-86; see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978); Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S 720, 745-46 (1977); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 139 (1968).
24. For a background on antitrust standing, see 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 12, 333-42; P. MARCUS, supra note 5, § 105; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, § 247; Tyler,
Private Antitrust Litigation. The Problem of Standing, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 269 (1978); Note,
Third Circuit's "Functional Analysis" Patrolling the Portals to Treble Damage Actions Brought
Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 21 B.C.L. REV. 659 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Third
Circuit's Function and Analysis]; Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964); Note, Standing to Sue in Private Antitrust Litigation." Circuits in Confhct, 10 IND. L. REV. 532 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Standing to Sue];
Comment, Advancing Consumer Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 32 U. FLA. L. REV.
334 (1980).
25. 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 723 (1974). Antitrust standing imposes restrictions in addition
to the traditional requirements of constitutional standing because plaintiff usually will
already have alleged injury in fact. See, Third Circuit's Function and Analysis, supra note 24,
at 663.
26. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972).
27. 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 728 (1974).
28. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
29. Conference of Studio Unions v. Lowes's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
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30
plaintiff choose his forum carefully.

III.

CRITICISM OF THE TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY

Legal scholars over the years have criticized the treble damage remedy. 3 ' Some of the criticism is directed generally at private antitrust actions. For example, one federal judge viewed the creation of private
antitrust litigation incentives as an attempt by government to shirk its
own law enforcement responsibility by farming it out to an army of private litigants. 32 Many critics question whether the remedy compensates
plaintiffs and deters violators, or serves the overriding policy goal of en33
couraging competition.
A major criticism is that the remedy is not efficient. The promotion of
competition encompasses several underlying policy objectives. One economic objective is to reach the optimal level of consumer welfare through
efficient use and allocation of scarce resources. 34 In an efficient economy,
"no rearrangement of inputs, outputs, and distribution is possible which
would make someone better off in terms of his own preferences without
making someone else worse off in terms of his." 35 For example, when a
monopolist increases prices and restricts production, he becomes wealthier, yet consumers pay higher prices for less satisfactory goods while society's productive resources are underutilized. The later effects may be
referred to as social costs or negative social welfare effects. Efficiency
requires rearranging production and distribution in a way that creates
the best utilization of resources for the betterment of social welfare,
36
thereby maximizing the wealth of consumers and producers.
Efficiency laid the groundwork for the reanalysis of certain types of
anticompetitive behavior, such as price discrimination and vertical mergers. In some circumstances this anticompetitive behavior may not have a
negative impact.37 Nonetheless, efficiency sometimes conflicts with other
policy objectives, such as dispersing wealth, limiting business size, broadening entrepreneurial opportunities, and generally decentralizing the
business structure of the American economy, thought to promote
30. Standing to Sue, supra note 24, at 555.
31. See Garvey, supra note 6, at 356.
32. "Ifthe law is just, it should be justly and rigorously enforced by government
agents. Government should not attempt to escape its responsibility by farming out its
responsibility to others who assume such responsibility for their own profit." J. BURNS, A
STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAwS 29-30 (1976) (quoting a federal judge who responded to
a survey of views on the antitrust laws).

33. See Garvey, supra note 6, at 356.
34. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12,
108.
35. P. AREEDA, supra note 5,
36. See tnfra note 41 and accompanying text.

103.

218 (vertical integration can operate to save re37. See P. AREEDA, supra note 5,
429 (price discrimination may increase
sources and reduce transaction costs); id at
output).
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competition.38

Since an economic approach reorders efficiency the substantive considerations of antitrust laws, logically it would redefine the nature of a remedy for private plaintiffs. The grounds for this contention lie in Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Ma. 39 In Brunswick, the United States Supreme
Court stated:
Plaintiff must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation. 40
In the substantive sense, antitrust injury means that plaintiff should not
recover unless he can relate his injury to "anticompetitive effects." Efficiency analysis is appropriate here because it ascertains the anticompetitive effects of monopoly in terms of social welfare costs.
Antitrust law has a strong justification for combating monopoly based
on economic efficiency. At a high monopoly price, consumers pay more
for goods when industry's output is less. The payment of the higher price
increases the transfer of wealth from consumers to monopolists. More
importantly, the changes in industrial output as consumers turn to
purchases of cheaper, less satisfactory goods cause inefficient use of productive resources, or deadweight loss. This loss is known as "social cost"
4
and has a negative effect on social welfare. 1
38. 1 P.

AREEDA

&D.

TURNER, supra note

12. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 5,

§ 2.
39. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
40. Id at 489; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.' "). See generally Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980);
John Lenore & Co. v. Olympic Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1977); Chatham
Brass Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Data General Corp.
Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc.,
468 F. Supp. 226 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
41. Competition for profits enhances social welfare by forcing industry to produce
what the consumer wants and to use the least amount of resources. A profit-maximizing
firm increases production of goods as long as the last unit, i.e., the marginal unit of production, increases the firm's profits. This occurs if the marginal unit adds more to revenues than it does to costs. Stated another way, as long as the marginal revenue exceeds or
equals marginal cost, profits increase. The monopolist, however, differs from the competitive seller in the maximization of profit through sales. For the competitive seller, marginal
revenue is the same at all output levels, and always equal to the market price. His output
decision has no impact on price since other sellers will cover his underproduction. He will
increase his output until the marginal cost of producing the last unit equals the market
price at which he can sell all his output. In the monopolist's market, the firm controls
price and output. If a single price is charged, every expansion of output reduces average
revenue and, as a result, the last unit sold produces less revenue than the preceding sale.
The monopolist chooses between a high selling price with fewer sales or a lower price with
greater sales. Thus, contrary to the competitive model, the monopolist increases profits by
restricting output and setting prices above marginal cost. He contrives a shortage to raise
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In private treble damage litigation, however, the remedy is measured
by an individual plaintiff's injury, typically in lost profits or the estimated value of his business. The value of the loss is multiplied threefold.
Since the award may in some circumstances bear little relation to negative social welfare effects, it may undercorrect or overcorrect the loss
compared to the total cost to society. Furthermore, the multiple of damages for efficiency purposes is not based upon the degree of difficulty
associated with detecting a violation. Therefore, the present section 4
remedy neither efficiently corrects nor efficiently deters antitrust violations. 42 If private plaintiffs are to promote economic efficiency, the
award received should approximate the efficiency loss and the multiple
must efficiently deter. If the award is excessive, as treble damages are
alleged to be, then firms will not engage in behavior that may result in
antitrust litigation, even if that behavior has a net beneficial effect on
3
social welfare.4
Redefining a civil remedy under an efficiency analysis involves several
prices and maximize personal gain. The behavior of the monopolist has serious and inefficient effects. Monopoly pricing leads to "deadweight welfare loss" representing the decrease in human satisfaction to those consumers who at the competitive price would buy
the product but who at the monopoly price, do not, or purchase other, less satisfactory,
substitutes. Society becomes poorer because reserves in the economy are used more productively in the industry that does not restrict output. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 12,
114; R. BORK, supra note 12, at 90-110; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW
9.1-.3 (2d ed. 1977).
Price

A

B
MC

MR

Demand
Quantity

The graph above illustrates the monopolist's pricing perspective. The monopolist's
profit is area A, representing sales of goods above marginal cost (MC), but below marginal
revenue (MR). The "deadweight loss" is represented by area B, and illustrates those
goods not produced up to marginal cost even though demand dictates production of a
greater quantity. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 549-50 (2d ed. 1981).
42. See Page, Antitrust Damages andEonomi'c Eftiency." An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47
U. CHI. L. REV. 467, 476 (1980); Note, Rethnk'g Antitrust Damages, 33 STAN. L. REv. 329,
340 n.44 (1981). See generally R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 41, at 549-53.
43. Page, supra note 42, at 472.
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radical changes. First, a plaintiff would not be allowed to recover damages unless his injury relates to an inefficient social cost. 44 Second, the
remedy should not compensate the plaintiff for more than is necessary to
correct inefficiency.4 5 Third, the federal court should deter antitrust law
violators by multiplying damages, not threefold, but according to a degree of the probability of apprehension.46 Therefore, an efficient remedy
corrects the cost of inefficient behavior while incidentally providing an
efficient deterrence.
Other inefficient costs arise from the availability of the treble damage
remedy. First, a private plaintiff has little incentive to mitigate his injury
or litigation costs because of his ability to recover treble damages. 47 In
fact, the plaintiff has an incentive to accumulate damages in order to
maximize his recovery. Second, the plaintiff will tend to set forth
groundless claims, with the hope of receiving a substantial settlement or
treble damages. Such nuisance suits tend to increase defendants' costs. 48

Third, litigation itself, including pleading, discovery, developing legal
strategy, and handling multi-district, multi-party, or class action litiga9
tion adds costs in seeking reparations.4
44. See id. at 472. Page's primary concern is that the type of loss to society that
should be the basis to a damage award frequently does not coincide with the type of injury
to individual plaintiffs. For example, an award of "lost profits" to plaintiffs who were
pricing above a fixed maximum price is an award which reflects the competitor's injury
but may not reflect or in any way relate to injury to social welfare. See id. at 491. On the
other hand, an award to plaintiffs of the overcharge levied or monopoly profit in a cartel
price-fixing suit would be a proper remedy because the overcharge is related to social
welfare loss, although here too, the private injury distinct from social cost. The cartel
raised prices and restricted output, which led to "deadweight loss," i.e., the underproducrive use of resources. The monopoly profits and deadweight loss flow from the same aspect
of conduct. Id at 479.
45. See Note, supra note 42.
The motivation for imposing antitrust damages certainly should be to rectify
injuries to society, but the proper means to prevent that social harm is to deter
the producer by confiscating its gain to the extent that the gain results from
inefficient exploitation. Consequently, antitrust damages for inefficient exploitative behavior should also deviate from . . . [the] objective of restoring the plaintiff to the status quo ante and should place the defendant in a position inferior...
whenever the defendant benefits from engaging in behavior that imposes a net
social cost. Therefore, optimal damages should not aim to prevent the transfer
of income from consumers to exploitative monopolists, but to direct firms with
market power to the form of exploitative behavior . . . that causes the least
deadweight loss.
Id. at 340 n.42.
46. Page, supra note 42, at 472. Page notes that treble damages does not efficiently
discount for the probability of apprehension. He does not, however, conclusively doubt
"the suitability of the current statutory scheme for its [deterrent] purpose." Id at 476.
47. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND
EcONOMIcs 84-90 (1976).
48. Id. at 90-95.
49. Id at 95. The costs of litigation, or "transaction costs" would likely exceed the
costs of merely confiscating the monopoly rent of defendant. See Note, supra note 42, at
340 n.44.
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The uncertainty of antitrust law is another ground for criticism. 50
Due to the law's complexity, a potential violator might have difficulty
determining the parameters of antitrust law. In addition, a conscientious
judge might be reluctant to award treble damages unless the violator's
conduct is clearly unlawful. Judicial reluctance, aggravated by treble
damages, seriously impedes the development of antitrust caselaw.
Although the treble damages remedy is the element that defendants
"most fear,"51 critics question whether treble damages actually deter antitrust violations. First, the quantitative value of the deterrence is difficult to measure. Not only is the quantity of undetected violations
unknown, but the frequency with which antitrust violations are attacked
cannot be satisfactorily determined. 5 2 Second, factors unrelated to antitrust law reduce the sting of treble damages to defendants. For example,
the Internal Revenue Service allows a defendant to deduct treble damages as a business expense if the defendant has not also been convicted
criminally for the violation.5 3 Third, a jury may restrict the amount of
damages, fearing that the treble damage award may be too harsh on the
defendant.5 4 Fourth, the private plaintiff may not bring a lawsuit, despite the attractive damage award, due to the considerable task of proving an antitrust violation.55 Proof of an antitrust violation requires the
ascertainment of illegal activity which necessitates complex investigation.
For example, the plaintiff alleging unlawful conspiracy to monopolize
under section 1 of the Sherman Act must show evidence of conscious
parallelism in behavior among conspirators.5 6 This requirement involves
undertaking a complex investigation to determine the extent of economic
interdependence of the parties and possible sources of parallel behavior.
Fifth, the private plaintiff faces significant risks in undertaking litigation,
such as the possibility of losing a beneficial relationship with a supplier
whom he sues under the antitrust laws, the potential for protracted litigation, and the difficulty of the currently ambiguous standing require50. Professor Areeda describes antitrust law as a "seamless web." P. AREEDA, supra
note 5, at 101; see 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, $ 331b (1978); L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 5, § 244.

51. Sims & Lawlor, supra note 6, at 40, col. 3; see also Antitrust Enforcement Act of /979."
Hearings on S 300 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979)
(statements of Sen. Metzenbaum and Ass't. Attorney General Shenefield).
52. Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1319,
1320-21 (1973).
53. I.R.C. § 162 (g) (1982).
54. Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damagesfor Destruction ofAll or
Part of a Business, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1569 (1967).
55. Wheeler, supra note 52, at 1329-32.
56. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, § 110; Wheeler, supra note 52, at 1329-30. See generally Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1954);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 808-10 (1946); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1939).
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ments. 57 Sixth, some critics suggest that when the corporation pays
treble damages, the true violator is not effectively deterred. Truly effective deterrence requires exacting payment from individuals or corporate
management responsible for violations of the law. This alternative does
not appeal to individual plaintiffs because corporate managers would be
unable to pay an attractive damage award. In addition, the conviction
of individuals may require higher standard of proof than the circumstantial evidence permitted in lawsuits against corporations.58

IV.

DEFENDING THE TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY

Since the treble damage remedy is an integral part of private plaintiff
suits under the antitrust laws, the foregoing criticism has broad implications. If such criticism led to removal of the treble damage remedy without providing an adequate substitute, there would be fewer actions by
private plaintiffs against antitrust violators because there would be little
incentive for vigorously enforcing the law. Hence, the underlying purpose of treble damages, to ensure an adequate inducement for enforcement of antitrust laws, continues to exist. Indeed, a major impetus for
this Note is the recognition of a possibility that Congress, imbued with
deregulatory fever, may weaken the private plaintiff's position as
"strongest pillar"59 in antitrust law enforcement by doing away with his
treble damage incentive.
A.

The Benefits of Treble Damages

One criticism of the treble damage remedy is its failure to correct the
cost to social welfare of an antitrust violation. A treble damage award
corrects and compensates for the loss to a private plaintiff, which may be
opposite to that of society. The remedy leaves the monopolist or successful plaintiff better off and society worse off, depending on whether the
award undercorrects or overcorrects compared to the social cost of an
antitrust violation.6o This elemental inefficiency, however, is a fair price
to society for individual undertaking of rigorous enforcement of antitrust
laws, which benefits society as a whole.
The above tradeoff is necessary because antitrust policy favoring compensation of plaintiffs fundamentally differs from efficiency in the structuring of damage awards. Efficiency is strictly concerned with efficient
deterrence. 6 1 The efficiency-based remedy does not appear to ade57.
58.
59.
60.

Wheeler, supra note 52, at 1330.
Id at 1334.
Loevinger, supra note 5.
See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.

61. "Efficient deterrence" is distinct from the deterrence brought about by private

treble damage litigation. The deterrence achieved under the threat of treble damage lawsuits is not efficient because it might discourage business behavior that is not technically
violative of antitrust laws. In effect, treble damages-induced deterrence may amount to
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quately ensure compensation which would induce private lawsuits.62

First, the remedy would not be based necessarily on the injury suffered
by the plaintiff who is in a position to initially ascertain the injury when
the decision is made to proceed with a lawsuit. Second, the efficient remedy is multiplied by some unknown factor based on deterrence. It is not
an automatic treble damage award. An efficient remedy requires a prospective plaintiff to make very complex determinations about productive
efficiency, and factors of deterrence. This approach may be too complex
and burdensome to ensure adequate compensation. Even if an efficient
remedy ultimately provides "adequate" compensation to plaintiffs, the
reward may not be apparent initially to a plaintiff and may cause a
plaintiff to avoid antitrust litigation altogether. A private plaintiff enforcement system must ensure adequate compensation so that injured
parties will participate.
Furthermore, an antitrust lawsuit involves an individual plaintiff seeking reparations for himself. Some legislative policymakers will be more
concerned, as Senator Sherman was, 63 with the monetary amount an in-

dividual plaintiff recovers than the amount society benefits in an abstract
economic sense. 64 Legislators are reluctant to take benefits away from
their constituents.65 Policymakers, including judges, will accept economic efficiency to the extent it streamlines and develops antitrust laws,
and promotes economic progress, optimal allocation of resources, equitable distribution of income, and economic freedom.66 But they will be less
inclined to apply the theory to the individual's scenario. They will perceive the individual plaintiff to be faced with the concrete circumstance
of suffering injury from an antitrust violation. To resolve the lawsuit, the
"overkill." Efficient deterrence theoretically deters only to the extent necessary to discour-

age particular anticompetitive behavior. It accomplishes degrees of deterrence based on
the probability of apprehension, or the difficulty of detection of a violation. See Page,

supra note 42, at 472-76.
62. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Economic efficiency was not a fundamental policy concern when Congress passed the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 47, at 24 ("Economists played an insignificant role in early
antitrust legislation"). But see R. BORK, supra note 12, at 20-21. "Wide discretion was
delegated to the courts under the Sherman Act . . . but . . . the delegation was confined
by the policy of advancing consumer welfare . . . . Sherman's draft outlawed arrangements designed, or which tend to advance, the cost to the consumer." Id Bork would
view efficiency as fundamental to ascertaining arrangements that tend to advance con-

sumer welfare costs.
64. Dorman, The Case for Compensation: Why Compensatory Components are Requiredfor
Eftlaent Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1117 (1980).
65. Id Congressmen favoring deregulation, however, may be willing to restrict the
rights of constituents. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying text.
66. See generally P. ASCH, ECONOMic THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 402
(1970). Professor Areeda acknowledges that efficiency is a "weak" formulation in some
circumstances "because it ignores other values considered important by our society." P.
AREEDA, supra note 5; see also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, § lb.
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judge will require explicit norms that are readily discernible as facts. 6 7
The efficiency analysis will be difficult to apply because many factual
intricacies have not been resolved. The actual social cost of a violation
may be one of the factual indeterminables, as is the factor of deterrence
based on the seriousness of the antitrust violation. Efficiency may be
effective as an approach to overall policy planning68 and revamping substantive antitrust law regulations. It is less useful, however, in fashioning
a damage award for the individual plaintiff who suffers competitive
injury. 69

There are other sources of inefficiency. The treble damage remedy
encourages private plaintiffs to accumulate damages and not protect
themselves from injury. It also encourages private plaintiffs to bring
groundless lawsuits, and to incur substantial reparations costs in undertaking treble damage litigation. The plaintiff's incentive, however, to
accumulate damages through the deliberate purchase of goods despite
the existence of alternatives, is a problem related to proof of injury.70
Because he must have made purchases from the antitrust violator in order to sue, a plaintiff can hardly avoid accumulating at least some damages. 7' The alternative is to dispense with private actions altogether in
favor of fines levied by a public agency which would not accumulate
damages to show injury. This alternative is undesirable for reasons that
will be discussed below. 72 The prevalence of plaintiffs accumulating
damages is not well documented. 73 The problems of bringing groundless
lawsuits and suffering substantial reparation costs in handling private
treble damage actions is common to all forms of litigation.
74
Actions brought for personal injury are frequently nuisance suits.

The increased costs of legal protection as a result of the proliferation of
lawsuits is not attributable to treble damages but rather to the growth of
litigation as a whole, including increases in the number of lawyers and
business transactions, and to the growing litigiousness of society. 75 Be67. L. SULLIVAN, suzra note 5, § lb.
68. Id.
69. For a response to criticism of the economic approach to antitrust laws, see R.
POSNER, supra note 41, § 2.3.
70. Hay, Book Review, 31 VAND. L. REV. 427, 433 (1978).
71. Id.
72. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
73. See Hay, supra note 70.
74. See Tyler, supra note 24, at 294-95.
75. See Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979 Hearings on £300 before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiay, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1979). But see Block & Sidak, The Cost of Antrust
Deterrence: Why Not Hang aPriceFixer Now and Then?, 68 GEo. L.J. 1131 (1980). "A private
plaintiff's incentive to invest in antitrust litigation increases as the expected recovery in-

creases ....

If large penalties or damage multiples induce an excessive investment in

private antitrust enforcement, Congress should limit the availability of private damages
....
Id. .at 1133-34. See generally I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, 331b;
Austin, Negatwve Efects of Treble Damage Actions. Reflctions on the New Antitrust Strategy, 1978
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cause the number of private treble damage actions filed has grown consistently with civil litigation as a whole, 76 the problem of proliferating
litigation does not appear to be aggravated in private antitrust actions by
the treble damage remedy. As long as public policy favors a private
cause of action, nuisance suits and reparation costs will be a source of
inefficiency.
The second major criticism involves the imposition of treble damages
on defendants for engaging in conduct that, owing to the uncertainty of
antitrust law, may not be readily apparent to defendants as unlawful. In
circumstances where antitrust law contains much uncertainty, a judge is
reluctant to place heavy, treble damage liability on defendants. Some
fear that such judicial restraint impedes the development of antitrust
law.

77

This criticism has several weaknesses. First, Congress would be acting
unfairly if it took away a compensatory right of a plaintiff in order to
make the judge's work easier or to benefit the development of antitrust
law in some other indirect way. Courts and judges exist to resolve disputes and to see that injured parties receive fair compensation. Second,
that antitrust laws are complex and uncertain would seem to favor the
plaintiff, who is substantially at risk in bringing a potentially expensive,
protracted lawsuit with an uncertain outcome. On balance, the
Supreme Court has accepted the view that the wrongdoer-defendant,
rather than the plaintiff, should bear the risk of uncertainty which defendant's conduct has created, 78 provided the plaintiff can prove that he
as been injured. A court should ensure an award to the plaintiff who
undertakes a successful, but difficult lawsuit. Third, the judge should not
L.J. 1353; Long, Damages as an Instrument for Redirecting Antitrust Polk,, 7 CuM. L.
REV. 413 (1977); Reich, The Antitrust Industy, 68 GEo. L.J. 1053 (1980). Reich estimates
the total annual cost of inefficiency in antitrust litigation to be $2.5 billion. Id. at 1068.
In reply to the allegation that the private antitrust caseload is crowding up court
dockets, the United States Supreme Court said:
That may well be true but cannot be a controlling consideration here. We must
take the statute as we find it. Congress created the treble-damages remedy of§ 4
precisely for the purpose of encouragingprivate challenges to antitrust violations.
These private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited resources
available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (emphasis original).
76. See Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979. Hearingson S.300 before the Senate Comm. on the
Judicia, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 187 (1979).
77. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
78. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). An example
where the Supreme Court has favored the private plaintiff over the defendant involves the
uncertainty of proving damages. The Court has allowed damages to be liberally construed. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562-63
(1931); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927);
Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 23-24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 987 (1974).
DUKE

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1983

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 9
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

fear imposition of hardship upon a defendant even when an award of
treble damages forces defendant out of business. Bankruptcy is not necessarily unfair or undesirable to society, because the productive assets
may pass into hands likely to use the assets in a more competitive fashion. 79 Fourth, whether or not the remedy operates to hinder development of antitrust law may not be significant in light of more basic antidevelopmental problems. A major hindrance has been the problem of
moving from a theory of competition to a policy of competition as reflected in antitrust law.80 Economic theory does not provide "clear cut"
answers.8 1 In addition, the underlying objectives of the policy to promote competition conflict at times.82 Perhaps the treble damage remedy
rather than hindering the developmental process of antitrust law, indirectly forces judges to sharpen their examination of policy issues and theory. A remedy with less probable impact may not force a careful
examination of the law of antitrust. Hence, the treble damage remedy is
ultimately beneficial to the development of law.
A final criticism concerns whether the treble damage award actually
deters behavior that violates antitrust laws. Payment of treble damages
for violating antitrust laws can be an excessive burden to some defendants, 83 even though damages may be deducted on the corporation's tax

return. The burden of undertaking private treble damage litigation is
not aggravated by the existence of the remedy. Recovery of treble damages, attorneys fees, and other costs offset the difficulty of bringing an
antitrust cause of action. To the extent that the remedy provides a powerful financial incentive for private action, treble damages enhances deterrence because the private plaintiff is in the best position to effectuate
enforcement of antitrusi laws. The private plaintiff is usually attuned to
competition and monopolistic behavior in his product market,84 since
anticompetitive behavior directly affects his sales and profits. The private plaintiff is familiar with business markets, enabling him to better
detect anticompetitive behavior. Because the private plaintiff is directly
affected by having his economic livelihood on the line, he is more inclined to be a vigorous enforcer of the law. 85 Also, as an injured party
79. Tyler, supra note 24, at 288-89 (1978).
80. See P. ASCH, supra note 66, at 5; Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust
Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1075, 1110 (1980); see also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 751-53 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. P. AREEDA, supra note 5, 105; see 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12,
113.
82. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
83. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, 311 a n.3; see also Tunney, A Vw
From the Senate, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 510 (1976). "[T]he mere threat of a private antitrust suit
by the chairman of British Petroleum was sufficient to cause Exxon to allow British Petroleum to enter the chase after Alaskan reserves." Id at 511.
84. Ferber, The Effectiveness of the Private Treble Damages Action as an Antitrust Enforcement
AMechamm, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 505, 507 (1976).

85. See id.at 507-09.
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suing in his own interests for treble damages, the private plaintiff will be
committed to antitrust enforcement. Although evidence is not available
on the effectiveness of the treble damage remedy as a deterrent, the existence of vigorous detection and enforcement by injured private plaintiffs
builds a strong justification for the remedy.
Despite the existence of treble damages, "[b]ig business has become
bigger and bigger, [and] monopoly has flourished." 86 Some contend that
this trend is not necessarily bad. 87 The trend raises the question of

whether antitrust laws can effectively control concentrated economic
power. When attainment of a competitive economy through antitrust
regulation is beyond the law's ability, Congress and the courts should not
consider elimination of treble damages. Instead, they should attend to
the needs of the victims of anticompetitive behavior-the private plaintiffs-by removing procedural barriers. 88
B Standing of Przvate Antitrust Plainti
Reducing the incentive for private antitrust litigants by limiting or
curtailing the award of treble damages, may be undesirable for another
reason. The requirement of antitrust standing, imposed by federal
courts, has substantially limited the private plaintiffs ability to bring a
cause of action.
Standing and damages are closely related under antitrust law. A
plaintiff must allege an injury of the type that antitrust laws are designed
to prevent. 89 Damages cannot be unduly speculative. The plaintiff must
establish his damages at the commencement of his lawsuit, as either a
consequence of direct injury to business or property, or injury within the
target area. Proving damages, therefore, is an important prerequisite for
bringing a lawsuit. In fact, some of the criticism which justified imposition of standing requirements could as well support restricting treble
damages. For example, the avoidance of ruinous, windfall recoveries,
and the reduction of administrative costs on the judicial system 9o are allinclusive grounds to limit private plaintiff litigation.
The standing limitations imposed on the private plaintiff's cause of
action are disturbing for two reasons. First, Congress intended section 4
86. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
87. See Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, 2 ANTrITRUST L. & ECON.
REV. 11, 54 (1968) (separate statement of R. Bork).
88. See Blecher, The Only Game in Town, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 550, 557 (1976).

89. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Standing is closely related to the concept of antitrust injury. As one court stated: "The courts demand, either in terms of a
standing doctrine or in terms of a requirement of antitrust damages, . . . that recovery be
confined to those who have been injured by restraints imposed by defendants on competitive forces in the economy." Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 568 F.2d 1163, 1168 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).

90. Tyler, supra note 24, at 286-94.
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of the Clayton Act to provide an opening of "the door of justice to every
man." 9 1 The Supreme Court, by upholding standing tests developed in
lower courts, has disregarded this express policy. Second, the judiciary
imposed standing limitations based on policy concerns that are more
properly dealt with by the Congress.92 For example, one reason for imposing standing limitations is the administrative burden resulting from
numerous difficult and lengthy antitrust lawsuits. The judiciary contends that the burden on courts, and ultimately upon the public, should
be limited. This argument, however, implies a political balancing of policy concerns. The language of section 4 of the Clayton Act indicates that
Congress has already decided that the public should bear the burden
imposed by private antitrust litigation.93 Incidentally, similar innovative
reasoning by the judiciary could have direct implications for the treble
damage remedy. For example, despite the language of section 4 that
private plaintiffs shall receive treble damages, Professors Areeda and
Turner have suggested that the judiciary may deny treble damages to
successful private plaintiffs in appropriate circumstances.94
C

Alternati'es to the Treble Damage Remedy

Critics of the treble damage remedy have offered a variety of alternatives, ranging from dispensing with private causes of action entirely, to
modifying the army of "private attorneys general"95 into a force of
"bounty hunters." There are three major alternatives. Kenneth G. Elzinga and William Breit recommend that Congress dispense wth private
action in favor of heavy fines imposed by public enforcement agencies
such as the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, and the Federal
Trade Commission.96 Professors Areeda and Turner propose that
awarding treble damages be made discretionary.97 The third alternative
is based on efficiency. For plaintiff to recover damages, he must first
show a negative effect on social welfare. The remedy is then multiplied
by an agreed number designated as the degree of difficulty associated
with detecting different types of violations. Thus, a damage award
under this theory would be efficient deterrence.98
91. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
92. Tyler, supra note 24, at 292-94.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id at 294.
See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, 33 1b.
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 47, at 112-48.
See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, 331b. ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Mergers and the prtvate Antitrust Suit.. The Private Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Policy and Law 104 (ABA Monograph No. 1, 1977) (statement of Prof. Turner).
98. Note, supra note 42, at 351 n.66. The Note suggests that § 4 of the Clayton Act be
redrafted to read (with deletions bracketed, and amendments italicized):
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything in the antitrust laws may sue therefor. . . without regard to the amount in
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L

The Pubh'c Enforcement Alternative

Elzinga and Breit have suggested leaving the job of enforcing the antitrust laws entirely to the public agencies. An obvious defect with this
alternative is that it decreases detection and, consequently, deterrence.
Elzinga and Breit maintain that threatening corporate violators with
heavy financial penalties99 would make up for the loss of private
plaintiffs.
As a first approximation to an optimal solution, a monetary fine should
be levied that would be sufficient to deter most risk averse managers
and that would enable society to achieve at least the present degree of
deterrence at far less cost and a greater degree of deterrence at the
same cost. Given this mandatory fine, the Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission could then increase or decrease the amount
of monopolistic activity by altering the amount of resources used in
detecting and convicting antitrust violators. 10 0
Although the public enforcement alternative seems attractive because
theoretically it would provide deterrence at less social cost, it has drawbacks. First, it is dependent on the prevalence of "risk averse" attitudes
among business executives. According to Elzinga and Breit, today's corporate executives are not the impetuous, swashbuckling, profit-maximizing entrepreneurs of a previous era. Instead, they are professional
managers highly concerned with minimizing risk and uncertainty.I °I
The threat of a large fine will frighten corporate directors into complying
with the antitrust laws. Before altering the entire system of antitrust law
enforcement, however, legislators should demand empirical certainty
that the risk averse attitude is as ubiquitous as Elzinga and Breit assume.
Even if the theory is correct, federal regulations as well as private and
public enforcement of antitrust laws may have helped create the "risk
averse" attitude among business executives. If the structure of antitrust
enforcement changes significantly, attitudes might reverse to those of the
pre-Sherman Act era.
In addition, the Justice Department and the FTC lack the economic
controversy, and shall recover [threefold the damages by him sustained] the larger

of either

(a) the defendant's profits attributable to the antitrust violation, divided by the court's
estimate of the probability that the violation would be detected, or
(b) the plaintift's actual injwy,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. The court shallrebuttably
presume the probabilityof detection to be one-third
Id The optional addition of "entire" to (a) enables the first plaintiff to confiscate all of
monopoly rent of the defendant in one transaction. Thus, one private plaintiff, acting as
"bounty hunter," would accomplish efficient deterrence, avoiding the inefficiency and expense of multiple private lawsuits by other injured individuals.
99. Criminal penalties are not realistic deterrents. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra
note 47, at 30-43.
100. Id at 115.
101. Id at 127-28.
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incentives to vigorously enforce the law. Generally, their incentive is to
maximize the self-interest of the staff at the expense of efficient antitrust
enforcement.102 Although staffs of public agencies do not profit financially from antitrust litigation, the staff's incentives include career advancement, and responding to the periodic demands of Congress.1° 3
Economic variables that provide the groundwork for selection of antitrust cases along parameters similar to the private plaintiff have little
influence on the Antitrust Division.1o4 These and other factors such as
the increased temptation for dishonesty brought on by the greater threat
of fines detract from the benefits of public enforcement.105
Another difficulty with the public enforcement alternative is its failure
to compensate individual victims, as opposed to redressing society as a
whole. Individuals who are substantially injured by antitrust violations
generally will not understand the "efficiency" provided by exclusive public enforcement.
2.

The Dtscretionay Remedy Alternative

The absence of discretion in awarding treble damages has troubled
some judges.1O6 If the treble damage award were discretionary, the judge
could award treble damages only where it would be appropriate to compensate a plaintiff for his extra effort. A judge would determine the size
of the award based on the nature of the evidence, including the hardship
to the defendant, the obviousness and gravity of the offense, the notice
defendant received, and considerations of what the situation would have
been absent an antitrust violation.
A discretionary remedy, however, has two disadvantages. First, it dissipates the incentive for private parties to bring antitrust lawsuits. Without concrete assurance of a treble damage award, a potential litigant
may not embark upon the considerably difficult task of seeking redress.
Wealthy defendants' use of delay tactics, including attempts to force
huge expenditures of money in discovery and pretrial maneuvers by
plaintiff,o7 aggravate incentive problems. The difficulty with incentives
may be acute in the instance of a class action; frequently the named
plaintiff has substantial initial management costs. 10 8 Second, a discretionary remedy, like the rule of reason, involves balancing values, facts,
and circumstances in fashioning a remedy that is equitable. The decision
whether to award treble damages is not an easy determination. In the
102.
(1980).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See McChesney, On the Economics of Antitnist Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1103, 1108
Schwartz, supra note 80, at 1093.
See Siegfried, The Determinantsof Antitrust Activity, 18J.L. & ECON. 559, 573 (1975).
But see K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 47, at 116.
J. BURNS, supra note 32, at 30.
Tyler, supra note 24, at 293.
See id.
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current debate on contribution legislation, opponents have raised concern that the new law will have the undesirable effect of making antitrust
litigation more complex.109 Therefore, a discretionary remedy would
make antitrust litigation increasingly complex and conflict with express
Supreme Court policy.11o
3.

The Eftcient Remedy Alternative

In the interest of furthering economic efficiency in antitrust law, advocates of change have recommended that private awards should relate to
social costs of antitrust violation. I1 Private awards also provide a means
for deterring hard to detect unlawful activity by multiplying the damage
award by the degree of likelihood that such a violation will be discovered
and penalized. In particular, one approach would award the amount of
monopoly rent,' 1 2 rather than the cost of plaintiff's injury, except as an
option in certain circumstances.'13 This damage award determination
removes any gain a monopolist might receive from his unlawful behavior.114 The amount of award, however, is discounted by the amount of
any productive efficiency increase by the monopolist because the monopolist may create benefits to society through economies of scale. A reduction in efficiency is therefore a prerequisite to recovering any damages.
Under this alternative, the multiple for any damage award is rebuttably
presumed to be three.
A variation of this alternative recommends that the status of private
litigant be that of a "bounty hunter," as opposed to the old status of
"private attorney general." In place of any individual plaintiff's showing
injury and seeking redress, this alternative provides for the bounty
hunter litigant, as the first in line to obtain the entire profits of the defendant that are attributable to the violation. The reason for this variation is to avoid litigation costs involved in redressing the injury of each
victim. The bounty hunter's reward also serves as an incentive.
As an alternative to mandatory treble damages, this remedy has two
obvious problems. First, the remedy is a "windfall" to the bounty hunter
plaintiff. Since antitrust violations typically have a wide range of direct
and indirect effects, limiting a cause of action to a class of efficient enforcers, or bounty hunters, will undoubtedly be perceived as unfair to
109. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731-32 (1977).
110. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Mnority, Report on Contribution, 49 ANTITRUST L.J.
306 (1980).
111. See .upra note 44.
112. Note, supra note 42, at 351 n.66.
113. See id at 338. The monopoly rent is related to "deadweight loss," or the social
cost, but it is not social cost. Monopoly rent represents the amount that consumers pay for
monopoly goods in excess of the competitive price. It is a transfer of income from consumers to producers. "Deadweight loss" represents wasted resources resulting from the monopolist's restriction of output. See id at 332-34.
114. Id at 338.
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other potential plaintiffs. In contrast, the treble damage system provides
adequate compensation for parties injured by antitrust violations. The
second problem is whether this remedy will operate to ensure to potential
plaintiffs a significant award and encourage them to undertake their private cause of action. The efficient remedy only provides a rebuttable
presumption that the multiple shall be trebled. The reason for this discretionary element is that efficient deterrence stipulates that a remedy
should provide for different levels of deterrence' 15 relative to the difficulty of detecting an antitrust violation and seeking redress. The degree
of difficulty in detecting an antitrust violation is an ambiguous standard
because it is not the same for all types of violations. Perhaps it is too
ambiguous to assuage the fears of private plaintiffs faced with expensive
antitrust litigation. Even with a similar violation, the degree of difficulty
in detecting a violation will vary with the facts and circumstances. The
sudden adoption of this alternative remedy without clearing up this ambiguous standard might create only inefficiency of a different sort. The
cost of uncertainty-less private law enforcement of antitrust laws6
would swamp the benefits of the change.1 1
V.

CONCLUSION

Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person may sue to recover damages for injury to business or property resulting from conduct
prohibited under the antitrust laws. The private plaintiff has been described as the "strongest pillar" of antitrust enforcement.1 7 The treble
damage remedy is an integral component of the private plaintiff's cause
of action because it induces private enforcement of the law by ensuring
compensation to the successful litigation. The substantial damage award
also operates to deter potential violators.
Although the purposes of the treble damage remedy are to compensate
the injured and to deter violators, the overriding goal of antitrust law is
preservation of a competitive economy. Critics recently have argued
that the treble damage remedy may frustrate competition by failing to
serve a related economic objective of improving overall social welfare.
Efficiency provides a framework of analysis that redefines antitrust law
to serve the improvement of social welfare. Efficiency, at least for now,
as a goal is secondary to compensation for the plaintiff. When efficiency
can be reconciled with compensation and inducement to action for all
injured plaintiffs, a statutory change in the remedy may be appropriate.
Inefficiencies of reparation costs for private action, however, will continue to be a problem.
The treble damage remedy has benefits which offset its undesirable
115. Schwartz, supra note 80, at 1098.
116. McChesney, supra note 102, at 1104.
117. Loevinger, supra note 5.
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aspects. Although treble damages-induced litigation sometimes imposes
hardship on defendants and the judiciary, these concerns have not sufficiently ripened into problems that support a change in the law. Furthermore, the desirability of retaining the treble damage remedy is reinforced
by judicially-imposed standing limitations on antitrust plaintiffs. Standing has reduced deterrence brought about by private action, since fewer
plaintiffs are able to seek redress. Similarly, removing the treble damage
remedy without replacing it with other, adequate monetary inducements
further dissipates enforcements by withdrawing the incentive for plaintiffs to undertake litigation.
The most serious issue is a political one. Congress, in its current mood,
may try to free business from regulation, including the regulation
brought on by the force of "private attorneys general." If so, one method
of reducing this regulation is removal of an integral incentive, the treble
damage remedy. The criticisms leveled at treble damages, including
inefficiency, hardship on defendants, ineffective deterrence, and limiting
substantive development of the law, provide fertile grounds for attack.
Nevertheless, if private damage litigation is to survive and to continue to
deter violations, further limitation must not be allowed.
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